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  Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health 
 
 
  Note by the Secretary-General 
 
 
 The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the 
report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Dainius Puras, submitted 












Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 





 Corruption can have a devastating effect on good governance, the rule of law, 
development and the equitable enjoyment of all human rights, including the right to 
health. In many countries health care is among the most corrupt sectors, threatening 
the sustainability of health-care systems worldwide. Corruption originates from 
power imbalances and asymmetries, is perpetuated by non -transparent decision-
making and reinforces ineffective and harmful policymaking and health services 
provision. The present report is focused not only on those forms of corruption that 
are legally defined as breaking the law and should be brought to justice, but also on 
those practices which undermine principles of medical ethics and social justice, as 
well as effective and transparent health-care provision. The right to health provides a 
valuable normative framework and constitutes a legally binding imperative to 
analyse and address corruption affecting the right to health and occurring in and 
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 I. Introduction 
 
 
1. Corruption can have a devastating effect on good governance, the rule of law, 
development and the equitable enjoyment of all human rights, including the right to 
health. Corruption has been the subject of international legal commitments as well 
as recent political commitments. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (targets 16.5 and 16.6) stipulate that 
corruption and bribery, in all their forms, should be substantially reduced by 2030 
and that effective, accountable and transparent institutions should be developed at 
all levels. 
2. While corruption manifests at many levels within societies and States, the 
present report focuses on the links between corruption and the enjoyment of the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health. Corruption in government, 
institutions and society at large is a significant obstacle to the enjoyment of the right 
to health of individuals and groups. In countries with a higher level of perceived 
national corruption, there is a much higher prevalence of poor health. 1 Corruption in 
Government and society can reduce the ability of the government to raise resources 
for health and other social sectors through putting off investors or donors or as a 
result of tax evasion.  
3. In many countries health is among the most corrupt sectors. 2 Health sector 
corruption, including for example the bribing of health officials and unofficial 
payments to health-care providers, obstructs the ability of States to fulfil their right 
to health obligation and to guarantee available, accessible, acceptable and good 
quality health services, goods and facilities.3 Yet corruption affecting health also 
occurs in other sectors and industries, for example, the water sector, and the food 
and beverages, tobacco and other industries. Moreover, corruption has significant 
implications for equality and non-discrimination since it has a particularly marked 
impact on the health of populations in situations of vulnerability and social 
exclusion, in particular those living in poverty and children. 4 
4. The right to health provides a valuable normative framework and constitutes a 
legally binding imperative to analyse and address corruption affecting health and 
occurring in and beyond the health sector. The framework reflects notions of good 
governance, transparency, accountability and participation, which are key when it 
comes to combating corruption. It places legal obligations on States to guarantee 
access to health-related goods and services for all, including individuals and groups 
in situations of vulnerability, and this requires them to take actions to curb 
corruption where it occurs.  
5. The present report is the result of extensive consultations among a wide range 
of stakeholders, including representatives of relevant United Nations agencies, civil 
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expert consultation in Bangkok and is very grateful to those who participated and 
provided valuable inputs for the present report.  
 
 
 II. Corruption and the right to health: key issues and trends 
 
 
6. Corruption is generally defined as “the misuse of public or entrusted po wer for 
private gain”.5 In relation to health, in many countries varying degrees of 
responsibility for public roles is entrusted to private actors, including private health 
professionals, pharmaceutical companies and health insurance companies. 
Corruption occurs in both the public and private sectors.  
7. A distinction is frequently made between “grand” and “petty” corruption. 
Grand or “high-level” corruption refers to acts committed at a high level of 
government that distort policies of the central government, for example a heal th 
minister “skimming” money off a loan from a foreign country. Petty or 
“administrative” corruption is smaller-scale everyday corruption by low- and 
mid-level public officials in their interaction with citizens, for example an informal 
payment from patient to doctor.6  
8. Other definitions distinguish between types of corruption, which among other 
forms include political and institutional corruption. “Political corruption” means 
manipulation by political decision makers of, for example, policies and rules of 
procedure in the allocation of resources, such as a government accepting a bribe in 
exchange for the construction of a large private hospital in the capital. “Institutional 
corruption” results from the normalization of behaviours that compromise 
truth-seeking and lead to the formation of perverse incentive structures, and thus 
addresses the behaviour of actors who exploit their institutional positions to 
influence institutional processes and actions.7  
9. All in all, corruption is a multidisciplinary phenomenon demanding a response 
from many fields of study. From a legal perspective, the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex) lists five acts of 
corruption, which can be translated as follows to the health context:  
 (a) The bribery of national and foreign public officials in exchange for an 
undue advantage; 
 (b) Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of funds from the 
health budget by a public official;  
 (c) Trading in influence; 
 (d) Abuse of functions;  
 (e) Illicit enrichment.8  
10. There are many other manifestations of corruption in the health sector and 
beyond. The present report focuses on several non-exhaustive, illustrative examples. 
11. Both corruption occurring in society at large (general corruption), as well as 
corruption specifically occurring in the health or other health -related sectors, have a 
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intertwined. Corruption in society at large may affect the regulatory environment 
and the efficiency of State institutions. It hinders economic growth  and sustainable 
development as well as equitable distribution of resources. 9 It undermines public 
confidence in the State and may obstruct attainment of the commitments made 
through Sustainable Development Goal 16 to create effective and accountable 
institutions.  
12. Corruption is particularly detrimental in that it increases mistrust on the part of 
all stakeholders, especially users of services, not only in the health-care system but 
also in the abilities and performance of local and national authorities in general. 
While little research has been done on the impact of corruption on health outcomes, 
it is suggested, for example, that countries with higher levels of corruption have 
higher levels of child mortality.10  
13. Alongside general corruption, health sector corruption is widespread and has 
serious consequences for the enjoyment of the right to health on the basis of 
equality and non-discrimination. The most common forms of corruption in the 
health sector are selling government posts, absenteeism, bribes, procurement 
corruption, theft or misuse of property, fraud, and embezzlement of user fee 
revenue, as well as informal payments to health-care providers.11 A range of 
stakeholders may be implicated in these and other corrupt practices in the health 
sector affecting the enjoyment of the right to health. These include but are not 
limited to health ministers, parliaments, accrediting and licensing bodies, public and 
private insurers, hospitals, health professionals and health professional associations, 
community health workers, pharmacists, pharmaceutical companies and 
biotechnology companies, medical researchers and medical research groups and 
patients and patient support groups.12 As will be argued below, they all bear 
responsibilities with regard to the right to health.  
14. Corruption is a significant challenge to the delivery of quality health care, 
which is central both to the right to health and to the commitment under Sustainable 
Development Goal 3 to universal health coverage. The health sector is extremely 
vulnerable to corruption at all levels — grand and petty, political and institutional — 
and occurring in both the public and private sectors. It is estimated that every year 
180 billion euros are lost to fraud and corruption in health care globally. 13 Health 
sector corruption negatively affects the (financial) resources available for health care; 
resources that are drained through embezzlement and procurement fraud are no longer 
available for paying salaries, funding health-care delivery or maintenance.14 For 
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effect on cancer care and care for HIV/AIDS.15 While these trends are visible in 
countries at all levels of development, it is evident that lower -income countries are 
more deeply affected by health sector corruption and a lack of transparency. In some 
countries, the health sector is considered to be the most corrupt sector of all.  
15. The lesser form of corruption, namely, petty corruption, is quite common in 
the health sector and includes informal payments from patient to health -care 
provider, absenteeism of health personnel and preferential t reatment. These forms of 
corruption are also sometimes called “survival corruption”, as they are exacerbated 
by a lack of resources in health-care settings, poor working conditions, low pay, and 
hierarchical structures, which drive people to engage in such acts. There is evidence 
that this “microform” of corruption has a particularly negative effect on the poor in 
society, as they are often unable to pay the bribes necessary for a certain service. 16  
16. Three main characteristics make the health sector particularly vulnerable to 
corruption: (a) power asymmetries or an imbalance of information, inter alia , 
between health-care provider and patient and between government, the private 
sector and rights holders; (b) uncertainty inherent in selecting, monitoring, 
measuring and delivering health-care services; and (c) the complexity of health 
systems: the large number of parties involved makes it more difficult to generate 
and analyse information in a transparent manner.17 A fourth problem, sometimes 
termed “provider moral hazard”, is that health professionals, public officials or 
private actors may choose to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of 
the rights holders towards whom they bear duties. Moreover, where health systems 
lack transparency, participation and accountability, a fertile breeding ground is 
created for corruption.  
17. Health reforms introduce organizational changes that can mitigate corruption 
but may also open new channels for abuse. As discussed during the expert 
consultation held in Bangkok, transferring responsibility for public health facilities 
from national to local governments may make them more accountable and less 
corrupt, but it can also create opportunities for local officials to divert resources for 
personal gain. Deregulation can eliminate requirements that are exploited by public 
officials to charge bribes, but it can also eliminate rules and oversight that are 
necessary to protect the public against unscrupulous actors. Permitting doctors to 
combine public and private practices is often justified as assuring staffing of public 
facilities, but may create situations where patients cannot obtain treatment to which 
they are entitled in public facilities, either because doctors are unavailable or 
because they encourage patients to see them privately.  
18. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that there is a “normalization of 
corruption” in health care; corruption can be so pervasive that it becomes accepted 
as “normal”.18 Yet these practices lead to groups and individuals being 
disadvantaged and to the infringement of human rights, such as access to health care 
on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. Changing views and perceptions in 
institutions and society of corruption as normal, unavoidable and justified is an 
important element in addressing the problem of corruption. Informal payments can 
be reduced by engaging with the public in a debate about the adverse consequences 
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Codes of conduct and ethics, training and education can also be used to support 
responsible conduct among professionals, including avoiding corrupt behaviour, 
although they may not be sufficient alone for behaviour change where it is most 
needed. States should also take action to address other trigger factors such as low or 
unpaid salaries, cumbersome administrative procedures and excessive red tape, 19 as 
well as enhancing transparency, participation and accountability.  
19. Beyond the health sector, corrupt practices that have a direct impact on the 
right to health have occurred in other private sector companies, including private 
water companies, tobacco manufacturers, food and beverage manufacturers, car 
manufacturers and the natural resources extraction industry. 20 Such practices 
include, for example, bribery of public officials and the manipulation of scientific 
research practices.21 In his previous reports, the Special Rapporteur has highlighted 
how power asymmetries have given rise to the widespread prioritizing of 
specialized medicine over primary care and public health interventions, including 
poverty reduction, labour conditions and early childhood services (see 
A/HRC/35/21, paras. 21-26). Such asymmetries generate preferences for physical 
health care over mental health care; biomedical interventions over non -biomedical 
interventions; the prioritization of certain disciplines that promote expensive 
biomedical technologies over social sciences in public health research agendas; and 
limited space for civil society participation in health policymaking.  
20. Although many everyday practices in health-related services may not be 
considered as corruption, legally speaking, their accumulation and their acceptance 
by various stakeholders have a detrimental cumulative effect on the performance of 
health-care systems and, indirectly, on individual and societal health. It is for that 
reason that the present report is focused not only on those forms of corruption that 
are legally defined as breaking the law and should be brought to justice, but also on 
those practices which undermine principles of medical ethics, social justice, as well 
as effective and transparent health-care provision. When such practices are not 
properly addressed, they pave the way to non-transparent decisions at all levels of 
policymaking, policy implementation and services provision and thus lead to 
corrupt environments and foster institutional corruption.  
21. Mindful that the nature of corruption means that it is often difficult to 
distinguish intentional malfeasance from inefficiencies, errors,  and differences in 
judgments and in priorities,22 the Special Rapporteur underlines that enhancing 
transparency is particularly important not only to address clearly corrupt practices but 
also to address these harmful phenomena, which obstruct the enjoyment of the right 
to health.  
22. In the context of universal health coverage, as one of the important global 
commitments under the 2030 Agenda, it is critical to strengthen health -care systems 
so that all segments of population trust primary care and primarily use this level of 
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measure to help decrease the prevailing tendency whereby users of health services 
prefer to bypass primary care and use specialized health -care services. The Special 
Rapporteur welcomes recent initiatives developed and replicated in some countries 
through which medical doctors educate the general population against wasteful or 
unnecessary use of medical tests, treatments and procedures in health care. Such 
initiatives, inter alia, “choosing wisely”, “realistic medicines” or “preventing over -
diagnosis”, should be supported by States as effective measures to develop rational 








 A. The right to health as a legally binding obligation 
 
 
23. The right to health is recognized in the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and international human rights treaties which are binding on States parties, including 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Wo rkers 
and Members of Their Families. Additionally, regional human rights treaties and 
many domestic constitutions protect the right to health. These international treaties 
and domestic laws obligate States to take action to respect, protect and fulfil the right 
to health and to address corruption where it interferes with their right -to-health 
obligations. They should inform responses to corruption alongside other legal 
instruments, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  
24. The right to health gives rise to obligations that provide a framework for action 
for duty bearers, as well as a framework of reference for monitoring and 
accountability. The right to health is subject to progressive realization. 23 This means 
that many aspects of the right to health do not have to be realized immediately; rather, 
States must take effective and targeted measures towards the progressive realization 
of the right to health. However, States also have some immediate obligations, 
including core obligations such as the equitable distribution of health facilities, goods 
and services; the provision of essential medicines; access to minimum essential food, 
basic shelter, safe and potable water and sanitation; and the adoption of a national 
health strategy and plan of action on the basis of epidemiological information.24 The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has also highlighted that universal health 
coverage is a core obligation (see the Committee’s general comment No. 15 (2013) on 
the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, 
para. 72). States must adopt and enforce legislative, regulatory and policy measures 





 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2.1; Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, art. 4.  
 
24
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 14 (2000) on the 






25. Corruption undermines the State’s obligation to realize the right to health “to 
the maximum of its available resources”.25 Notably, embezzlement diverts financial 
resources from their intended purpose. Corruption also reduces the ability of 
governments to generate maximum resources, including through international 
cooperation, in the first place by making countries less attractive to donors and 
investment,26 and may support tax evasion. Measures to prevent and protect against 
corruption offences are therefore an essential component of this obligation. 
26. Moreover, since the right to health includes not only a right to health care but 
also to the determinants of health, it offers a road map and tools for addressing 
corrupt action in the health sector as well as corruption affecting the social, 
environmental and other determinants of health. Measures to address the right to 
health should be holistic and integrated, go beyond the provision of health services 
and be underpinned by cross-departmental commitment (see A/HRC/32/32, para. 37). 
It requires the improvement not only of outcomes but also of processes, for example 
with governance and health systems required to operate on the basis of principles 
including transparency, participation, accountability and non-discrimination, all of 
which have a particular importance for addressing corruption.  
27. In recent years, a number of United Nations human rights bodies have 
acknowledged the negative impacts of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights. 27 
By its decision 2002/106, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the impact of corruption on human 
rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights. In her reports, the Special 
Rapporteur established that the enjoyment of both civil and political and economic, 
social and cultural rights are seriously undermined by corruption. 28 In a report 
published in 2015, the Advisory Committee to the Human Rights Council explained 
that a human rights perspective on the impact of corruption can move the victims to 
the centre of the fight against corruption by highlighting the negative impacts  of 
corruption on the individuals and groups concerned. The human rights perspective 
also reveals that the State bears the ultimate responsibility for such acts. Establishing 
the links between corruption and human rights can promote access to human rights 
mechanisms to combat corruption, thus creating new opportunities for monitoring and 
litigation (see A/HRC/28/73, paras. 27-28 and 32). 
28. When it comes to addressing corruption and a lack of transparency, the  right to 
health is closely related to and dependent upon other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that are critical to the fight against corruption, including the right to life; 
freedom of expression including the right to seek, receive and impart info rmation; 
freedom of association; and the right to a fair trial. 29 For example, freedom of 
expression offers a basis for protecting whistle-blowers, which is of key importance 
in combating corruption, while the right to information is vital to access informa tion 
including on financial transactions and decision-making processes that may reveal 
corruption. The promotion and protection of these rights will also therefore be vital 
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 B. Available, accessible, acceptable and good-quality health care 
 
 
29. The right to health requires that health-care goods, services and facilities be 
available in adequate numbers; financially and geographically accessible, as well as 
accessible on the basis of non-discrimination; acceptable, that is, respectful of the 
culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities and sensitive to gender 
and life-cycle requirements and of good quality, thus meeting all the criteria of 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality (AAAQ).30  
30. Petty and grand corruption and institutional and political corruption can have a 
negative impact on the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health 
care. When money that has been allocated to the health sector is embezzled , the 
availability of health services and goods is affected.  
31. Corruption can also arise when States fail in their obligation to ensure that 
there is an adequate number of health professionals receiving domestically 
competitive salaries31 as petty corruption is often used by health professionals or 
other local officials to make up for inadequate, or unpaid salaries, although it should 
also be noted that bribes and illicit charges also occur where health professionals 
earn adequate salaries. As well as competitive salaries, reward for correct 
performance can also help to tackle corruption. Absenteeism of health service staff 
also negatively affects availability.  
32. As to physical accessibility, health sector corruption can lead to choices that 
are less favourable to the community, for instance as a result of bribes, health -care 
facilities may be built in urban or wealthy areas rather than in locations accessible 
to poor or rural populations.  
33. In terms of affordability, health-care providers can make health-care services 
more expensive by demanding payments (informal or under -the-table payments), 
which can put treatment out of reach and be a matter of life or death, contribute to 
morbidity or impoverish patients and their families. The payment of bribes by 
patients for privileged care is common in many countries and results in 
discriminatory access to care, with wealthier patients likely to access care more 
easily than those that are too poor to pay bribes. 32 As a result of bribery in 
procurement processes, medicines may be more expensive.  
34. In terms of information accessibility, a lack of information about rights in the 
health system can provide a smokescreen for corruption. Moreover, patients are 
vulnerable due to the so-called “information imbalance” in the health sector, with 
doctors being more knowledgeable about the health -care services that they provide 
than the receivers.  
35. Corruption also infringes medical ethics, which are an essential component of 
acceptable health care. Lastly, in terms of quality, corruption can affect the quality 
of medicines, for example, when regulators are bribed to carry out less rigorous 
checks, or when hospital administrators purchase medicines of unknown quality. 33 
Quality can also be compromised where bribes are extorted or accepted in decisions 
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medicines to include on essential medicines lists,35 or to market unregulated 
medicines, which can increase mortality and morbidity among those affected,36 as 
well as hampering disease control efforts. Nepotism, cronyism and other forms of 
favouritism can also compromise the quality of health and health -related services. 
36. The right to health requires that States take action, including policy, legislative 
and budgetary action, to prevent corruption from impeding the available, accessible, 
acceptable and good-quality health care. 
 
 
 C. Underlying and social determinants of the right to health 
 
 
37. Corruption compromises the ability of the State to guarantee the underlying 
and social determinants of health including safe drinking water, safe and nutritious 
food and a healthy environment, and exacerbates the discrimination and inequalities 
that prevail in societies throughout the world.  
38. To take the example of water, around 10 per cent of water sector investment is 
lost to corruption. Corruption can make water inaccessible and unaffordable and 
affect the quality of water. In some low-income countries, corruption can add an 
estimated 30-45 per cent to the price of connection to a water network. 37 The 
increasing role played by private sector actors in water services requires the State to 
adopt an appropriate regulatory framework.  
39. The harmful effects of the tobacco industry and unhealthy foods industry has 
been covered up by manufacturers and industry lobbyists, including through 
sponsoring research to downplay links to health problems. Misinformation, pressure 
and bribery from private sector actors, including the food and beverage  and breast-
milk substitute industries38 and the tobacco and the polluting industries, can 
interfere with the obligation of governments to adopt an appropriate legislative, 
regulatory and policy framework to promote and protect public health.  
40. Discrimination encompasses any distinction, exclusion or restriction that has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 
Non-discrimination and equality are human rights obligations which are 
fundamental to realizing the right to health. Not only must health and other goods 
and services be available to all on the basis of non -discrimination, but broader 
promotion and protection of equality and non-discrimination are vital in 
guaranteeing the equitable enjoyment of the right to health.  
41. There is ample research indicating that corruption and a lack of transparency 
exacerbate socioeconomic deprivation. Lower social groups carry a heavier burden 
in a society rife with corrupt elements.39 In turn, the equal enjoyment of the right to 
health is deeply affected by poverty and income inequality. 40  
42. In the health sector, low-income and other groups in vulnerable situations are 
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have the most difficulty affording the informal payments that are often required to 
receive the medical treatment they need. In health-care settings that face a high 
level of corruption, the poorer sections of the population and those who live in rural 
areas may suffer longer waiting periods at public health clinics and are also more 
frequently denied vaccines than rich and urban sections of the population. 41 Health 
sector corruption can also lead to discrimination more directly when health -care 
providers and professionals treat patients differently according to their income and 
their contact with the medical profession.  
43. There are several intersecting groups in society that suffer from corruption on 
other grounds. There is, for example, evidence that corruption does not affect rural 
areas in the same way as it affects urban areas. Women can often be particularly 
affected by health sector corruption. In many countries, they are more likely to use 
health care than men, a pattern partly explained by their increased use of services 
during their reproductive years. They may thus be disproportionately affected by the 
effects of health sector corruption, for example when they lack the money to afford 
informal payments necessary for assistance around childbirth. Women may also be 
more vulnerable to informal payments where they lack economic means, for 
example where they do not participate equally in the paid labour force or do not 
have equal access to or control of financial resources within the household. 
Furthermore, women constitute a large proportion of health -care personnel, and can 
thus be disproportionately affected when health sector corruption negatively affects 
the timely payment of proper wages.42  
 
 
 D. Participation, transparency and accountability 
 
 
44. Meaningful participation of people in decisions that affect their health and 
socioeconomic well-being is a key component of the right to health and crucial 
when it comes to combating corruption in health care and in society at large. States’ 
obligations under article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights require that the right to participate in decision-making processes 
affecting their health and development must be an integral component of any 
relevant policy, programme or strategy.43 Sustainable Development Goal target 16.7 
stipulates the duty to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative 
decision-making at all levels.  
45. Participation in health decision-making leads to improved health outcomes and 
is essential for ensuring the distribution of policies and programmes to broader 
segments of the population, thus making governance more accountable. 
Participation goes beyond merely being educated, informed or consulted. It implies 
a human right to actively engage individuals and groups in the development, 
implementation and review of policies, standards, indicators, benchmarks or 
legislation, particularly aimed at including the voices and needs of mor e vulnerable 
or otherwise underrepresented and especially affected populations.44  
46. Key elements of meaningful participation with the aim of preventing  and 
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information and the participation of relevant stakeholders in health  decision-
making, including in health sector plans, in the annual budget process and in review 
processes for health laws, policies and programmes.45 In the context of budgets, 
participation involves the engagement of a variety of stakeholders in determining 
the allocation of funding, as well as monitoring expenditure. Methods for realizing 
participation include forums and conferences, local health committees and teams, 
citizens’ juries, public meetings, but also institutional participation, for example in 
hospital boards.46 Key stakeholders include, but are not limited to, national health 
assemblies, community-based and grass-roots organizations, professional 
associations and other non-governmental bodies and civil society organizations.  
47. Patients’ organizations and other more empowered interest groups may exert 
influence on health decision-making by lobbying in favour of the prescription and 
reimbursement of expensive drugs or particular programmes or treatments in a 
health service at the expense of other treatments or programmes. Paradoxically, 
these activities can reinforce imbalances and power asymmetries, a s they too often 
result in undue pressure on policymakers to invest in specialized care and vertical 
programmes of treatment for certain diseases at the expense of primary care and 
holistic medicine. Thus participation has to be carefully planned, balanced  and 
accompanied by open and transparent planning mechanisms to ensure representation 
of a broad range of civil society and other key stakeholders.  
48. Where there is opacity surrounding decisions at the political, macro or micro 
levels, corruption can flourish, go undetected and occur with impunity. 
Transparency unveils corruption and is inextricably linked to the right to access 
information, participation and accountability. Access to information and 
transparency laws provide a framework for addressing corrupt practices, while the 
regulations and monitoring arrangements are also vital. Transparency can often be 
enhanced by the participation of rights holders and civil society organizations in 
decision-making processes that may be prone to corrupt practices.  
49. There are particular challenges to transparency in the health sector. 
Asymmetric information between providers, payers and users leads to provider or 
user moral hazard. Information is divided between a multitude of different actors, 
including regulators, payers, providers, users and suppliers, which reduces 
transparency. There are many varying ways to improve transparency depending on 
the context. For example, transparency in procurement is enhanced through public 
access to procurement bidding results, monitoring of the prices paid and analysis of 
bids.47 Transparency in recruitment can be supported through the publication of 
criteria. Transparency through the promotion of information that sets out the 
services and treatments to which individuals are entitled and how these services are 
reimbursed can help minimize inequalities in access to care through corrupt 
practices. The publication of transparent waiting lists can negate the practice of 
bribery to access more rapid treatment.  
50. There is a significant demand from civil society for accountability of 
Governments and other institutions.48 Sustainable Development Goal 16 includes a 
commitment to create effective, transparent and accountable institutions at all 
levels. Accountability is at the heart of human rights and central to the fight against 
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corruption has taken place and resulted in human rights abuses. Effective 
accountability processes are also important for the reason that they can have a 
deterrent effect in relation to corruption. It is therefore troubling that research 
suggests that accountability for corruption is rare,49 indicating a need for 
governments to take concerted steps to strengthen accountability mechanisms and 
processes. 
51. Accountability comprises three elements: monitoring (“what is happening, 
where and to whom (results) and how much is spent, where, on what and whom 
(resources)”), review (“analysing whether pledges, promises and commitments have 
been kept by countries, donors and non-state actors”)50 and remedies and action.51 
The rule of law, transparency and access to information, including on decision -
making processes, budgets and financial transfers in both the public and private 
sectors, provide vital conditions which help to strengthen accountability.  
52. Health systems are complex and a wide range of monitoring and review 
processes have a role to play in enhancing accountability for the right to health in 
the context of corruption. In terms of monitoring, budget monitoring, effective and 
accurate accounting, audits and public expenditure tracking surveys are ways of 
monitoring how funds have been allocated and whether they have been distributed 
as intended, or whether corruption may have occurred. Yet in many low-income 
countries, Governments lack financial and technical capacity to operate such 
systems in an effective way.52 As well as monitoring of funds, monitoring of health 
professionals’ practice and supplies is also important. The establishment of well-
resourced and independent anti-corruption and fraud agencies to prevent and detect 
corruption, including in the health sector, can also support the monitoring dimension 
of accountability.53  
53. Judicial, quasi-judicial, political and administrative mechanisms at the local, 
national and international levels can all play an important review function. 54 It is 
essential that rights holders are aware of their entitlements and that complaints 
procedures are simple and accessible. Independent complaints procedures are often 
valuable. Rights holders must be able to participate in review procedures carried out 
by quasi-judicial, political or administrative bodies. Moreover, whistle -blower 
protection in the public and private sectors for individuals in procurement bodies, 
health authorities, health service providers and suppliers of medicine and equipment 
supports review through encouraging the reporting of corruption. 55 Domestic human 
rights bodies, such as national human rights institutions, as well as internat ional 
mechanisms such as the United Nations treaty bodies and the universal periodic 
review, can provide an important contribution to enhancing accountability for the 
right to health, including in the context of corruption.  
54. Governments must take action where monitoring and review have revealed 
corrupt practices. Not only should sanctions be applied, but remedies must also be 
awarded and implemented. Accountability should not be exclusively equated with a 
blame and punishment model that puts front-line workers in the firing line. Rather it 
is better understood as reinforcing the rule of law, including the promotion and 
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recommendations from other review bodies, can lead to actions by governments and 
other duty bearers producing transformative changes in the health sector. 56  
 
 
 E. Role and responsibilities of non-state actors 
 
 
55. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all organs of society have 
human rights responsibilities. It is now widely acknowledged that, while States 
parties are ultimately accountable for the right to health, all members of society, 
including health professionals and the private business sector have responsibilities 
regarding the realization of the right to health.57 As indicated in the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, private actors have the responsibility to 
“respect” human rights.58  
56. Private hospital and insurance boards and other institutions responsible for the 
financing and provision of health care or underlying determinants have an important 
role to play in combating corruption and lack of transparency within their 
organizations. They must ensure that they comply with national laws and regulations 
regarding corruption and human rights. They may adopt an anti -corruption strategy, 
including internal regulations aimed at prohibiting and preventing the diversion of 
budgets, medicines or medical supplies for personal advantage; the acceptance of 
informal payments by their health personnel; preferential treatment for well -
connected individuals; the use of hospital equipment for private business; the 
improper referral of public hospital patients to private practices; and illegitimate 
absenteeism of medical personnel while being paid. When it comes to preventing 
informal payments, the creation of individual contracts with personnel and increased 
pay scales while sanctioning poor performance are recommended.59 In the case of 
whistle-blowers, hospital boards and other actors should refrain from punitive actions 
and provide adequate protection and guarantees to safeguard their personnel and 
services. 
57. Organizations administering health insurance schemes and insurance 
regulators have a responsibility to prevent embezzlement, theft and illicit 
enrichment from the health insurance budget and bias in favour of certain 
procedures, medical professionals or products due to conflicts of interests. They 
should avoid adverse selection practices leading to patients being refused on the 
basis of their health status, age, financial capacity or other factors. 60  
58. The medical profession has a responsibility to abstain from unethical and 
unprofessional behaviour under its professional codes, which often emphasize a 
commitment to integrity and non-corrupt behaviour.61 Among other acts, the medical 
profession is to refrain from favouritism and other forms of preferential treatment 
for well-connected individuals; accepting bribes; using hospital equipment for 
private business; and referring public hospital patients to their private practices. 
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interests in their clinical activities. They should avoid conflicts of interest that 
compromise their decisions regarding the care of patients.  
59. Education in the health-care sector is one important element in that regard. 
The doctrine of the “five-star doctor” needs to be reaffirmed to translate modern 
values and scientific evidence into everyday medical practice. Modern medical 
doctors need to be not only good clinicians but also effective community leaders, 
communicators, decision makers and managers. That philosophy should be 
complemented by a strong human rights-based approach and evidence gained from 
the modern public health approach.  
60. While medical doctors and other health-care workers are accountable and 
responsible for ethical conduct and non-corrupt behaviour, it is crucial that corrupt 
practices and institutional corruption do not affect decisions made at the level of 
academic medicine. Medical schools that train future medical doctors and carry out 
medical research and university hospitals that provide a tertiary level of health -care 
services and use expensive biomedical technologies have a key role in preventing 
corruption in the rest of the health-care system. It is very important to use the 
principle of academic autonomy in a responsible way. The academic medical elite 
has enormous power over decision-making and when they advise policymakers on 
how to invest resources proper accountability mechanisms need to be in place.  
61. Within the health sector, the pharmaceutical industry stands out as being 
particularly prone to corruption. Corrupt practices take place at all stages of the 
pharmaceutical value chain, including during research and development, 
manufacturing, registration, distribution, procurement and marketing. The key 
problems are a lack of objective data and understanding of corruption in the  
pharmaceutical sector, a weak legislative and regulatory framework, potential undue 
influence from companies and a lack of leadership committed to anti -corruption 
efforts.62  
62. While governments have the primary duty to regulate and oversee the 
pharmaceutical sector, the pharmaceutical industry has a responsibility to engage 
with governments on the issue of corruption. It has an independent responsibility to 
prevent corruption throughout its value chain, inter alia , through institutional checks 
and balances, protection and security of medicines and the adoption of monitoring 
and accountability procedures such as audits and whistle-blowing mechanisms for 
all staff in the company.63  
 
 
 IV. Issue in focus: corruption and the right to mental health 
 
 
63. The Special Rapporteur has raised the issue of the global burden of obstacles 
(see A/HRC/35/21) that persists in mental health-care systems globally and how this 
hinders the realization of the right to health. Obstacles include the overuse of 
biomedical model and biomedical interventions, in particular psychotropic 
medications; power asymmetries; and the use of biased evidence. The Special 
Rapporteur advocated for a shift in mental health policies and services. 
64. Existing evidence shows that mental health policies and services are especially 
prone to ineffective and corrupt practices, as well as the use of biased evidence. 
These obstacles, if not properly addressed, divert mental health policies and servic es 
from the effective realization of the right to health and hinder implementation of 
Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 3 and a very important target: to 
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65. Mental health policies and services illustrate how lack of transparency and 
accountability in the relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and 
academic medicine can lead to institutional corruption and have a detrimental effect 
on mental health policies and services, not only on a national or regional scale but 
also at the global level.  
66. As mentioned above, institutional corruption occurs when an organization or 
institution is no longer sufficiently independent to pursue its stated goals or mission 
effectively. It occurs when systematic practices develop within an institution that 
are legal, accepted and normative, but nonetheless undermine its integrity. Thus, 
institutional corruption results from the normalization of behaviours that 
compromise truth seeking and from perverse incentive structures (e.g., promotions; 
peer-reviewed publications) that reward problematic behaviour. It is a solution -, not 
blame-, oriented framework — a “bad barrel” rather than a “bad apple” problem. 64  
67. Representatives of academic psychiatry and other mental health researchers 
can have significant and long-lasting ties to drug manufacturers yet believe that they 
are immune to explicit or implicit bias, provided that they disclose these ties. 
Similarly, journal editors can have financial ties to the same drug companies and 
publish these studies, also believing that their judgment is not compromised. 
However, there are decades of research demonstrating that scientists are not immune 
to guild interests and implicit bias and that transparency or disclosure of financia l 
conflicts of interest is an insufficient solution.  
68. Thus, the framework of institutional corruption highlights both the harm done 
and what is lost, namely, harm to patients; loss of public trust and confidence in the 
integrity of academic medicine; and distortion of the scientific evidence base. It 
exposes the economies of influence that contribute to those harms and losses and it 
is a call for action to neutralize those influences. Below, the Special Rapporteur 
reviews three main areas in the mental health field using this framework, namely, 
the process of development and promotion of diagnostic categories for mental 
health conditions, psychotropic drug research and clinical practice guidelines.  
69. Because of its global reach, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) has been referred to as the “bible” of psychiatric diagnosis and is 
used worldwide in psychiatric research. However, over the last decade there have 
been increasing concerns that the interconnected needs of the pharmaceutical 
industry and the psychiatric community may have played a role in the development 
or expansion of questionable diagnostic categories.  
70. A 2006 study found that the majority of DSM -IV (fourth edition of the 
Manual) panel members had financial ties to drug companies and that 100 per cent 
of the Mood Disorders work group and the Schizophrenia and Psychotic Disorders 
work group had commercial ties to the companies that manufacture antidepressants 
and antipsychotics. Despite a disclosure policy implemented by the American 
Psychiatric Association one year later, the majority of individuals serving on the 
DSM-5 (fifth edition of the Manual) still had such ties and, as with the DSM-IV, the 
most conflicted panels were those for which pharmacological treatment was the 
first-line intervention.65  
71. The widening of disease boundaries has medicalized normal human experience 
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diverting attention away from the cultural, socioeconomic and political context of 
emotional distress.  
72. Studies have revealed that commercially funded trials are up to four times 
more likely to report industry-friendly results than trials without such financial 
conflicts of interest.66 In addition, there is clear evidence of publication bias in 
psychotropic drug trials; research demonstrating the ineffectiveness of a drug can be 
suppressed or written in a way that conveys a positive result. 67 Such publication 
biases result in an inflated perception of efficacy and an underestimation of the 
harms of psychotropic medications.  
73. The Special Rapporteur observes that pharmaceutical companies have a vested 
interest in finding a new indication (namely, a new disorder) for their drugs when a 
patent expires since this allows the drug manufacturer to obtain an additional three 
years of exclusivity for the drug in question. Pharmaceutical companies have used 
“exclusivity” as an informal mechanism to effectively extend patent protection for 
that time period.  
74. The inclusion of new disorders in DSM-5 referred to above have led some to 
question whether the updated edition inadvertently functioned as a vehicle for high -
profit patent extensions. It was found that in the majority of clinical trials testing 
drugs for new DSM disorders (e.g., “Binge-eating disorder”), there were 
commercial ties between DSM-5 panel members and the pharmaceutical companies 
that manufactured the drugs that were being tested for these new disorders. 68 This is 
not to suggest any wrongdoing on the part of DSM panel members, but rather to 
emphasize the economies of influence at play and that transparency alone is an 
insufficient measure for systemic problems.  
75. The Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned that treatment guidelines for 
mental health conditions are particularly vulnerable to industry capture because the 
absence of biological markers for mental health conditions increases clinical 
uncertainty and subjective judgments. Bias in such guidelines creates the potential 
to expose patients to harm from unnecessary treatment or from treatment that is not 
evidence-based and leads to a drain on resources.  
76. When guidelines are produced by medical specialty groups, especially those 
with strong and pervasive industry ties, these groups tend to recommend market -
driven treatment options (e.g. pharmacotherapy) when less expensive and safer 
(e.g., lifestyle change or psychosocial support) approaches are available. 69 For 
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narrative reviews74 have explicitly concluded that because of the risk benefit profile, 
antidepressants should not be used as a first-line intervention for mild depression, as 
this may result in overtreatment. Nonetheless, some guidelines produced by 
industry-funded psychiatry specialty organizations continue to use a predominately 
biological framework and recommend antidepressant medication as a first -line 
intervention for even mild depression.75  
77. Institutional corruption in the mental health system has several consequenc es. 
One of them is the medicalization of human diversity and misery, which expands the 
number of patients labelled with mental illness. According to WHO, more than 
300 million people of all ages globally suffer from depression, and depression is the 
leading cause of disability worldwide.76 However, some researchers have raised 
serious questions about the reliability of these disease burden estimates. One study 
concluded that poor-quality data limit the interpretation and validity of global 
burden of depression estimates. They warn that uncritical application of these 
estimates to international health-care policymaking could divert scarce resources 
from other public health-care priorities.77 While industry certainly profits from a 
biological approach that emphasizes these disease burden estimates, the attainment 
of the right to health globally becomes ever more elusive.  
78. It is the global burden of such obstacles, rather than the global burden of 
mental disorders, that should be addressed as a priority in mental health policies and 
services. In that connection, corruption in mental health research, education and 
services should be addressed as one of the most important concerns or obstacles.  
79. Indeed, institutional corruption in mental health has reinforced the 
medicalization of emotional distress and has thereby undermined the ability of 
decision makers to focus on the underlying and social determinants of health and 
address the way in which the health of socially disadvantaged groups is determined 
by exposures to societal and environmental risks and resources. 78  
80. Certainly, many people are in need of mental health services and often they do 
not have access to them. However, all stakeholders, especially policymakers and the 
leadership of the psychiatric profession, must address the fact that overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment of milder forms of anxiety, depression, inattention, age -related 
cognitive decline and the like unnecessarily creates pathological identities in people 
and exposes individuals to the iatrogenic effects of labelling and the side effects of 
treatments without offering them benefit to offset the harm. Individualizing, 
decontextualizing and medicalizing emotional distress reinforces health disparities by 
reducing the capacity of health systems to serve those with more severe mental health 
problems — the ones, often from disadvantaged groups, who need the care the most.  
81. The medicalization of the public mental health field is driven by a lack of 
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biased evidence being translated into practice worldwide. This is an unacceptable 
tendency and must be addressed by States and international organizations, with a 
view to ensuring that mental health policies nationally and globally are driven by 
non-biased evidence and a human rights-based approach. The obvious crisis in 
academic psychiatry,79 influenced by a doubtful relationship with the 
pharmaceutical industry, has contributed to what could be called the “corruption of 
knowledge” in mental health and represents a warning signal not only to mental 
health-care practice and research but to the health sector as a whole.  
 
 
 V. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
 
 A. Conclusions 
 
 
82. Corruption has a devastating effect on good governance, the rule of law 
and equitable access to public goods and services. Corruption is a human rights 
concern and it has a particularly damaging effect on the enjoyment of the right 
to health. The health sector is especially prone to corruption, which threatens 
the sustainability of health-care systems worldwide.  
83. The right to health offers a valuable normative framework and a legally 
binding imperative to address corruption in and beyond the health sector. The 
framework embraces the principles of good governance, transparency, 
accountability and participation. The right to health is closely related and 
dependent on other human rights, which are also important for combating 
corruption, including freedom of expression, which gives guarantees to whistle-
blowers. 
84. All forms of corruption at all levels have a negative impact on realization 
of the right to health. Many of these forms originate from power imbalances 
and asymmetries, which are widely prevalent in the health sector. Such 
asymmetries are perpetuated by non-transparent decision-making and 
reinforce ineffective and harmful policymaking and health services provision.  
85. In accordance with their legal obligations under international human 
rights law, as well as high-level political commitments made in the Sustainable 
Development Goals to address corruption and develop effective, accountable 
and transparent institutions by 2030, States should provide leadership to 
confront the domestic and global causes of corruption and its impact on the 
right to health through legal, policy and programming measures in the health 
and related sectors.  
86. Applying a human rights-based approach to health and related policies 
and avoiding selective approaches to human rights and the production and use 
of evidence in the realization of the right to health are the most effective 
measures for combating corruption.  
 
 
 B. Recommendations 
 
 
87. The Special Rapporteur urges States to: 
 (a) Implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption and to 
explicitly criminalize the corrupt acts identified in that treaty and which are 




 Arthur Kleinman, “Rebalancing academic psychiatry: why it needs to happen — and soon”, The 






 (b) Ensure the integration of the right to health as a standard in 
anti-corruption laws and policies aimed at regulating the health sector;  
 (c) Provide for comprehensive whistle-blower protection for those 
reporting corruption offences in the health sector and beyond, which includes 
guaranteeing the anonymity and protection of whistle-blowers; 
 (d) Progressively build resilient health systems, with a special focus on 
health promotion and primary care, so as to root out the problem of systemic 
incentives for corruption in health sector; 
 (e) When elements of a health sector are decentralized or handed over to 
the private sector, to ensure that there are sufficient checks and balances to 
ensure that this transition addresses corruption and, at the least, does not lead 
to more corruption. There must be adequate oversight, transparency and 
monitoring of private sector and decentralized provision;  
 (f) Raise awareness among the actors in the health sector, including 
health-care providers, insurers and the providers of medicines and medical 
equipment about the harmful effects of corruption on the right to health and 
insist on their responsibilities under the right to health; 
 (g) Raise awareness among the general population about the negative 
impact of all forms of corruption in the health sector on individual and societal 
health and well-being. National human rights institutions can play a role in 
such awareness-raising and this may include the establishment of corruption-
reporting hotlines; 
 
  Participation, transparency and accountability 
 
 (h) Guarantee the right to participation of the population in all actions 
aimed at combating corruption in health, such as through the disclosure of 
important health-related information, as well as in the design and delivery of 
health programmes; 
 (i) Engage a variety of stakeholders, such as community organizations, 
professional organizations and civil society organizations, including those 
representing groups in vulnerable situations, in determining the allocation of 
funding, as well as in monitoring budget expenditure at the national, local and 
institutional levels; 
 (j) Ensure monitoring and accountability in the health sector and 
related sectors through the establishment of well-resourced and independent 
anti-corruption and fraud agencies, as well as accessible and effective 
accountability procedures for health system users who encounter corrupt 
practices; 
 (k) Ensure judicial and other forms of review of violations of 
anti-corruption legislation; and effective remedies where corruption leads to a 
violation of the right to health;  
 
  Corruption in health-care provision 
 
 (l) Address petty corruption by health professionals by guaranteeing 
decent living wages and working conditions, job security and reward for good 
performance and conduct; 
 (m) Prevent misuse of dual practices whereby health-care providers 
inappropriately refer patients to their own private practices; and take 






 (n) Create awareness among health-care providers that preferential 
treatment of well-connected individuals is unethical and at odds with the main 
principles for realization of the right to health; 
 (o) Develop non-biased and evidence-based treatment guidelines to 
reduce opportunities for corruption; 
 (p) Create awareness, for example through the development of ethical 
guidelines, among health-care providers that they should remain independent 
from outside organizations and avoid conflicts of interest with the best interests 
of their patients; 
 (q) Create awareness among health system users of their rights as well 
as identifying and reporting corrupt acts; 
 (r) Support initiatives that prevent excessive and unnecessary use of 
diagnostic and treatment interventions and involve users of services in shared 
decision-making with medical doctors. 
88. The Special Rapporteur also urges other relevant stakeholders to:  
 (a) Take into account the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical 
Companies in relation to Access to Medicines (A/63/263, annex); 
 (b) Address, through legal, policy and other measures, corrupt practices 
taking place in all stages of the pharmaceutical value chain, including during 
research and development, manufacturing, registration, distribution, 
procurement and marketing of medicines;  
 (c) Strengthen measures to address corruption and unethical practices 
in the process of generation of knowledge through research, dissemination of 
such knowledge through medical education and the development of guidelines 
for diagnostics and treatment of health conditions;  
 (d) Strengthen those elements in the medical education curriculum of 
future medical doctors that strengthen their knowledge and skills in order to 
prevent them from becoming involved in corrupt acts, unethical behaviour, 
reliance on excessive and unnecessary medical interventions, disease 
mongering, favouritism, informal payments and other practices that are either 
corrupt or increase the risk of corruption;  
 (e) Address the production and dissemination of biased outcomes of 
research in psychiatry and prevent, through transparent changes in medical 
education, research and practice, institutional corruption in psychiatry and 
mental health care; 
 (f) Enhance transparency and avoid misusing the principle of academic 
autonomy when investments in health and health care are addressed, so that 
the integrity of academic medicine and its commitment to the realization of the 
right to health is not undermined. 
 
